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Optimality and Preservation of
Consumer Defenses-A Model
for Reform
Benjamin Geva*
Recent legislation in the United States and Canada has cut back on the traditional
insulationfrom consumer claims and defenses which has been enjoyed by thirdparty
financers. This Article examines the theoretical underpinnings of a rule which pre-
serves consumer claims and defenses against third party financers, in light of the
objective of optimal resource allocation, and defnes those situations in which appli-
cation ofsuch a rule is appropriate. The Article advocates that the scope a apreser-
vation odefenses rule should include not only those situations in which the seller and
financer have someform ofan existing bargaining relationsh v, but also where credit
is extendedfor a restricted use by independent lenders. Thejustfcationsfor restric-
lions on a consumer's ability to assert claims and defenses and the extent offinancer
liability are also considered within an optimal resource allocation framework. The
author concludes by proposing a model statute which implements his analysis of a
proper preservation /consumer defenses rule.
INTRODUCTION
IN RECENT YEARS, the insulation of third party financers' of
consumer purchases from claims and defenses arising from a
seller's breach has been significantly curtailed. Legislatures in the
United States2 and Canada3 have been actively launching an "as-
sault upon the citadel"4 of insulation in order to preserve defenses
under contracts for sale of consumer goods against the financers.
* Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto;
LL.B., Hebrew University of Jerusalem; LL.M., S.J.D., Harvard University. Visiting Asso-
ciate Professor of Law, University of Illinois, 1980-81.
I. These include: multiparty credit card issuers (see note 9 infra and accompanying
text), direct lenders, holders of consumer notes evidencing sales, and beneficiaries of waiver
of defense clauses under contracts of sales.
2. See, e.g., Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (1976). See generally
Geva, Preservation of Consumer Defences Against Third Party Financiers: Statutory Devel-
opments in the United States, in PAPERS AND COMs. DELIVERED AT THE EIGHTH ANN.
WORKSHOP ON COM. AND CONSUMER L., TORONTO, OCT. 1978, 72 (J. Ziegel ed. 1980);
Hudak & Carter, The Erosion of the Holder in Due Course Doctrine: Historical Perspective
and Development-Part II, 9 U.C.C.LJ. 235 (1977).
3. See, e.g., Part V of the Bills of Exchange Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.4 (1970 1st
Supp.); See generally Buglass, Recent Judicial and Legislative Developments in Canada, PA-
PERS AND CoMS. supra note 2, at 39.
4. This use of the phrase is from Murphy, Another "Assault Upon the Citadel" Limit-
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The protection given by this legislation is, however, far from uni-
form.5 Statutes differ with respect to the types of transactions cov-
ered, the defenses available to the consumer, and the amount of
financer's exposure to them.
These statutes normally provide consumers with protection
against purchasers of consumer notes issued under sales transac-
tions6 and against assignees of contracts of sale which contain
waiver of defense clauses.7 However, protection given by statutes
against purchase money lenders' is generally limited to lenders
who have had prior dealings with the seller involved in a transac-
tion, for example, credit card issuers.9 Also, the amount of a third
party financer's exposure to consumer defenses varies under the
statutes from the amount financed, or the face value of the loan
contract, 10 to the amount owed to the financer either at the time of
asserting the defense or notification of its existence."t
This Article examines the justifications for, and the appropri-
ate scope of, a rule preserving consumer defenses against third
party financers in light of the underlying objective of optimal re-
source allocation, or optimality.'t Scholarly views concerning
whether a preservation of defenses rule actually results in optimal
ing the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver ofDefense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 OHIO
ST. L.J. 667 (1968).
5. For example, some state statutes impose time restrictions on when defenses may
be raised against a holder in due course, varying from five days after the consumer is
notified of the assignment in Illinois to a full year in Wisconsin. Hudak & Carter, supra
note 2, at 259. Other statutes may require additional preconditions such as the duty to
make a good faith effort to settle the dispute which is iinposed by the Fair Credit Billing
Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1667 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Preservation of Creditors' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.3
(1980).
7. Id
8. A purchase money lender makes loans which enable debtors to buy goods from a
third party; see U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972).
9. See, e.g., Consumer Protection Act of 1978, QUE. REv. STAT. c.9, § 116 (1978),
which does not apply to multilateral credit card plans.
For the treatment of an issuer in a multilateral credit card plans as "lender," see Harris
Trust & Savings Bank v. McGray, 316 N.E.2d 209 (Ill. App. 1974). Under such a plan, an
issuing bank contracts with consumers to pay the price of goods acquired from a merchant
who works under an agreement with the issuer or with another bank which is a member in
the same interchange system. Payment to the seller is made by the bank upon the present-
ment of invoices or "sale slips." See Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 85 BANKING L.J. 941, 950-61 (1968).
10. This is the exposure under the Federal TradeCommission Rule and Canadian
provincial legislation; see notes 131-32 infra and accompanying text.
11. Such is the exposure under the Canadian federal Bills of Exchange Act, supra note
3, and most state legislation in the United States.
12. See note 31 infra.
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resource allocation differ widely. Professor Alan Schwartz is the
author of the classic presentation on the consistency between the
preservation of consumer defenses and optimality.13 The opposite
view is taken by Professors Richard Posner and Richard Ep-
stein. 14 This Article supports Professor Schwartz's analysis and
extends its implications in two major respects. First, while Profes-
sor Schwartz deals only with situations where a seller and a
financer have an established bargaining relationship, Part II of
this Article argues that optimality is increased by extending pro-
tection also to consumers who obtain restricted use loans from in-
stitutional lenders.' 5 Second, this Article examines some
questions which were not discussed by Professor Schwartz. These
questions are concerned with the amount of a financer's exposure,
the defenses available to a consumer, and the possible limitations
on the right to assert these defenses. 6
The Article begins by presenting the goals of consumer de-
fense preservation and its effect on optimal resource allocation.
The discussion goes beyond existing literature by specifying the
costs saved by preserving consumer defenses, and by being more
explicit in tying the implementation of the goals of cost minimiza-
tion and distribution to the pursuit of optimality.' 7 Parts II and
III extend the implications of the framework established in Part I
and set out those situations where preservation of consumer de-
fenses is most consistent with the pursuit of optimality. Part II
considers the financing arrangements in which consumer defenses
should be preserved.' 8 Part III examines the appropriate scope of
a financer's exposure to consumer defenses."'
At the-conclusion of the Article, following a short critique of
some features of current legislation,2" two model statutes are
presented. Appendix I is an unproclaimed section of the British
Columbia Consumer Protection Act. It is suggested that this pro-
vision approximates optimality more closely than any other en-
13. Schwartz, Optimality and the Cut-Off of Defenses Against Financers of Consumer
Sales, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 499 (1974). See also Comment, The FTC'S Holder-
in-Due-Course Rule: An Ineffective Means ofAchieving Optimality in the Consumer Credit
Market, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 821 (1978).
14. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Epstein, Unconscionabil-
ity. 4 Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975).
15. See notes 85-127 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 128-49 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 21-84 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 85-127 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 128-49 infra and accompanying text.
20. See Part IV infra.
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acted statute in North America. Appendix II is my own proposed
Model Preservation of Consumer Defenses Act which is designed
to implement the analysis presented in this Article.
I. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESERVING CONSUMER
DEFENSES AGAINST FINANCERS
A seller of goods who is unwilling to make adjustments for a
consumer's justified dissatisfaction is "legally responsible either in
a direct suit by the purchaser or at the insistence of the third party
[financer] ...if the latter has been unable to collect because of
the successful assertion of defenses based on dissatisfaction with
the merchandise."'" A rule which preserves consumer defenses
against a third party financer does not alter this framework, but
minimizes and distributes the costs which are engendered by inad-
equate seller2 2 performance (cost of seller misconduct) 23 in the
consumer goods market.24
Absent a preservation of defenses rule, the initial loss created
by a seller's breach is borne by the consumer-buyer; remedies can
be pursued against the seller, but the buyer must continue pay-
ment to the financer Under a preservation of defenses rule, the
consumer can assert dissatisfaction with a seller's performance by
withholding payment. Thus, the loss is initially allocated to the
financer. A financer faced with a preservation of defenses rule, in
addition to pursuing a claim against a seller who has breached,26
may withdraw credit from merchants with poor records and can
21. Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialy Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 59 YALE L.J. 1209, 1215-16 (1950). Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission erred in
stating that in the absence of a rule preserving consumer defenses against third party
financers, "the current commercial system ... allocates all... costs [resulting from sell-
ers' breaches] to the consumer/buyer." 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,522 (1975).
22. In this Article, "seller" in the context of "seller's breach" represents anyone liable
for the performance or breach of the contract for sale. That person can be either the "im-
mediate seller" (the party in privity under the contract for sale) or, absent privity require-
ments, the manufacturer or any intermediary in the chain of distribution. Likewise, "seller
performance" refers to the performance of the contract for sale by any "seller."
23. Costs of "seller misconduct" are "the result of fraud, breach of warranty, or failure
of consideration." Note, Direct Loan Financing of Consumer Purchases, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1409, 1411 (1975).
24. For this characterization of the issue, see id. at 1411. See also 40 Fed. Reg. 53,522
(1975).
25. See accord, Schwartz, supra note 13, at 499.
26. A financer's remedy against the seller can arise under contract or as a matter of
law. The Model Act following this article includes a provision which would expressly rec-
ognize the financer's right to a remedy. See Model Act § 4 and Comment (Appendix II
infra).
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distribute projected losses. Loss distribution may be accom-
plished by charging more for credit from consumer borrowers or
by shifting the loss to the merchants, thereby causing the internal-
ization of this cost by the merchants. The latter option can be
achieved by doing business with merchants on a pure recourse ba-
sis, by demanding more security from merchants in the form of
larger reserve accounts, or by raising discount rates.27
The preservation of defenses rule is designed to minimize the
overall costs produced by a seller's breach. Those costs which
cannot be eliminated are internalized by the seller and the
financer so that the prices charged to consumers more accurately
reflect the true social costs2 8 of engaging in a credit sale transac-
tion.29 The underlying assumption is that the financer is better
able to minimize the cost of seller misconduct than is the con-
sumer.
30
In examining the validity of this assumption and its contribu-
tion to optimality,3' it should be noted that the superior ability of
a financer to minimize the costs of seller misconduct emanates
from "the very nature of his business."3 2 Comparing a financer
and a consumer, the former has a stronger position in the market-
27. Discount rates can be raised directly or indirectly. One method of indirectly rais-
ing discount rates is to withhold from the merchant the incentive payments made in the
form of a percentage of the finance charge. Another method is to withhold the discounted
value of consumer obligations, by means of a reserve account, and to release these funds as
the consumer obligations are satisfied. See generally Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Con-
sumer Transactions: Requiem, Revival, or Reformation?,. 60 CORNELL L. REV. 503, 538
(1975).
28. The social cost of production is the cost that society incurs when a resource is used
to produce a given commodity. C. FERGusON & S. MAURICE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 128
(1970).
29. Commenting on this situation, the Federal Trade Commission has noted that
"pricespaid by consumers [will] more accurately reflect the true social costs of engaging in
a credit sale transaction." 40 Fed. Reg. 55,506, 53,523 (1975) (emphasis added). The lan-
guage used by the FTC is somewhat unfortunate. See notes 50-51 infra and accompanying
text.
30. See Note, supra note 23, at 1411-17.
31. iThere are two related but not identical concepts of efficiency--'economic
efficiency', in which no output can be expanded without reducing some other out-
put, and 'Pareto optimality'-particular efficient points to which voluntary ex-
change would lead, and at which no person can be made better off (as he himself
sees his well-being) without making someone else worse off (as he himself sees his
well-being).
McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 30 (1971).
"Pareto optimality" is "the particular efficient point to which voluntary exchange would
lead starting from a particular distribution of wealth." Id at 36. But see R. POSNER, supra
note 14, at 9-10. Following Professor Schwartz, supra note 13, this Article uses "efficiency"
and "optimality" interchangeably.
32. Note, supra note 23, at 1413.
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place, better organization, and better access to information. A
financer is also a more effective plaintiff.
The consumer sues the merchant only once or episodically.
The financer, even though it does not control the merchant or
participate in the breach of warranty, ordinarily has a continu-
ing relationship with him and some experience of his perform-
ance of warranties. The financer is certainly better equipped
with staff to check the merchant's reputation for reliability and
fair dealing. . . [and] is best able to force redress by maintain-
ing an action over against the merchant or by charging with-
held amounts .... 3F
Furthermore, a financer "can refuse to deal with undercapitalized
dealers or with dealers with a history of unhappy customers." 4
Indeed, empirical studies made in the United States in conjunc-
tion with state35 and federal36 preservation of defenses rules indi-
cate the adverse effect of such rules on the operation of
"marginal" or disreputable merchants.
It is a basic tenet of economics that efficiency, the optimal allo-
cation of resources, 37 is enhanced when all costs of an item are
reflected in its price.38 Where "resources are shifted to those uses
in which value to consumers, as measured by their willingness to
pay is highest, . . . we may say that they are employed effi-
ciently. . . . Efficiency is [thus]. . . determined by willingness to
pay,"39 and only where all costs are perceived by consumers can
33. Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM.
L. REv. 445, 472 (1968). But see Schwartz, supra note 13, at 506, 506 n.l 1.
34. Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New
UCCC, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 272, 280-81, 281 n.29 (1969). The effectiveness of this power
would be bolstered by conferring upon financers immunity from possible tort actions by
merchants for a financer's refusal to deal. See Model Act § 7 and Comment, § 5 (Appen-
dix II, infra).
35. See CommentAbolishing Holder in Due Course In Oregon Consumer Transactions:
Legal and Economic Consequences, 52 ORE. L. REV. 461, 476 (1973); Note, Utah's UCCC
Boon, Boondoggle, or Just Plain Doggle, 1972 UTAH L. REv. 133, 142-45; Note, A Case
Study ofthe Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cool-
ing-OffPeriod, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969). Leading studies are summarized by Randolph &
Whitman, The Last Nail in the Coffin of the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 14 AM. Bus.
L.J. 311, 324-27 (1977).
36. See the qualitative evaluation prepared for the FTC by Yankelovich, Skelly and
White, Inc., reprinted in Consumer Claims and Defenses: Hearings Before the Subcomn on
Consumer Protection and Finance ofthe House Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 211 (1977).
37. See note 31 supra.
38. One of the two "economic advantages of a competitive price" is that the price is
"such that marginal cost equals price." G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE, 178-79 (3d
ed. 1966).
39. R. POSNER, supra note 14, at 10. "Efficiency" is used by Professor Posner inter-
changeably with "Pareto optimality"; see note 31 supra.
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willingness to pay be accurately expressed. As explained below,
minimizing the costs of seller misconductcontributes to optimality
by eliminating or reducing costs which are not reflected in the
stated price of consumer credit goods.4"
Notwithstanding the seller's basic liability," absent a preserva-
tion of defenses rule, not all costs of seller misconduct are shifted
to the responsible seller. For example, where the seller's insol-
vency prevents the consumer from recovering the full amount of
damages, or where the seller is able to avoid or limit liability be-
cause of the consumer's inferior position as a litigant, the con-
sumer would bear a portion of the loss.42 Moreover, the economic
goal of compensating for breach of contract is to place the injured
party in the position in which he or she would have been had the
contract been honored.4 3 Yet, where a seller in breach of a con-
sumer contract refuses to give redress voluntarily, this sum, even if
entirely collected (together with expenses incurred in pursuing its
recovery, plus legal interest), does not represent the entire loss to
the consumer. As explained by Professor Schwartz, the consumer
is not compensated for satisfaction loss' or for the loss of the
earning differential of the sum recovered (what the consumer
could earn with this sum, less the legal interest)." Additionally,
loss to the consumer's human resources cannot be compensated.
The adverse effect on the consumer's physical and emotional re-
sources during the time between the breach and the recovery, or
even shortly thereafter, results in decreased productivity due to
sleepless nights or worries. The loss of the mental energy invested
in obtaining redress also cannot be compensated. Finally, the loss
resulting from an unforeseeable breach is not recoverable.46
40. "[Consumer credit and sales are considered a single activity." Note, supra note
23, at 1416. But cf Schwartz, supra note 13 (under whose model the effect of the rule is on
the price of credit only).
41. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
42. Note, supra note 23, at 1412, 1412 n.13.
43. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damagesfor Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
277, 278 (1972); Robinson v. Harman, 154 Eng. Rep. 363, 364-65 (Ex. 1848).
44. This is the loss of "consumer surplus," defined in P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 417
(8th ed. 1970) as the difference between total utility and total market value. See Schwartz,
supra note 13, at 504-07.
45. "Put in the form of an equation...
Loss (if defenses can be cut off) = earnings differential (on the part of the price
paid that otherwise could be withheld), or satisfaction loss, + additional legal
expenses (if any), + earning differential (resulting from repair costs when they
would otherwise be incurred by the seller)."
Schwartz, supra note 13, at 506-07 (defining "earning differential" at 504-05).
46. Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Indus. Ltd., [1949] 2 K.B. 528,
1980]
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A preservation of defenses, rule eliminates the loss of the earn-
ing differential of those amounts which would have been paid to
the financer during the period of seller breach. Also, by reducing
the number of cases where a breach occurs,4 7 the rule minimizes
the loss of the earning differential of amounts paid before the
breach (loss of satisfaction) and diminishes both the loss of human
resources and the uncompensated, unforeseeable loss.
48
These gains, desirable as they may be, are not themselves a
gain in optimality. Resources are allocated optimally where mar-
ginal private cost equals marginal social cost.49 Absent a preser-
vation of defenses rule, however, a seller's private production
costs, which are reflected in the stated price, are lower than the
entire social production costs (stated price plus uncompensated
loss). Yet, this situation does not represent a disparity between
social and private costs. The entire cost to consumers consists of
both the stated price and the value of the uncompensated loss.
50
Insofar as consumers react rationally to this overall cost of con-
sumer credit goods, resources will tend to gravitate toward their
most valuable use if voluntary exchange is permitted.5' There-
fore, without a preservation of defenses rule, the existence of un-
compensated loss adversely affects optimality only when
additional assumptions are made. These assumptions contem-
plate a model where part of the loss is not borne by either sellers
or consumers, and the overall consumer reaction to the uncom-
538-39; ef. Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (contractors) Ltd., [1972] 3 W.L.R.
502, 507 (C.A.) (plaintiff was unable to recover loss which did not flow "naturally and
directly" from the defendant's wrongful act).
47. The existence of a preservation of defenses rule reduces the number of transac-
tions in which a breach occurs by virtue of the superior ability of the financer, as compared
with the consumer, to exert pressure on merchants. A financer can refuse to do business
with a disreputable merchant, thereby reducing the number of financed sales transactions,
and is a better plaintiff than a consumer in seeking redress for a breach. Through a
financer's better ability to police the consumer goods marketplace, fewer breaches will oc-
cur. See notes 31-36 supra and accompanying text.
48. Of course, it is assumed that a reduction in the number of cases of breach reduces
the overall cost of breach.
49. C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, supra note 28 at 275. "Private costs," whether ex-
plicit or implicit, are either amounts allocated to bid away the resources from alternative
uses, or amounts that could be earned in the best alternative use. Id at 128-29. "Margi-
nal cost" is unit cost as a function of output. R. POSNER, supra note 14, at 8, 8 n.l 1. The
social cost of production is the cost society incurs when a resource is used to produce a
given commodity. C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, supra, at 128.
50. This is a major aspect of the "Coase theorem." See Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. L. & EcON. 1 (1960); Schwartz, supra note 13, at 511, 511 n.16.
51. R. POSNER, supra note 14, at 9-10.
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pensated loss is made in an irrational manner which is inconsis-
tent with utility maximization.
It seems clear that uncompensated loss is not always borne en-
tirely by the consumer. Loss to human resources may adversely
affect third parties, particularly the consumer's employer." Lost
employee productivity is assumed by the employer. 3 Where an
owner of a resource-the consumer's employer, insofar as he or
she is contractually entitled to the use of the consumer's human
resources--cannot charge a price for its use, misallocation of re-
sources results. 4 Thus, the sale of a product at a price which does
not include the loss borne by the employer results in a larger out-
put than would occur if all costs were reflected in the final price.55
Thus, the first additional assumption seems to be reasonably
based.
The second assumption, that consumers react irrationally to
the risk of incurring uncompensated loss, also appears quite real-
istic.5 6 There is evidence that consumers' purchasing decisions are
made essentially on the "best buy model": on the basis of stated
price in relation to product quality. 7 This decision would then
exclude elements not embodied in the stated price.5 8  Also,
"[c]omplex, fine print standard forms might be viewed as goods
whose quality people cannot determine."59 Consumers are thus
unlikely to consider that their right to withhold payment against
financers could be forfeited. In today's markets "most agents...
52. Use of the courts also entails a cost. This cost of seller misconduct is not charged
to the merchant or the consumer, but to society at large.
53. The employer's loss is not recoverable. Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 14, at 150.
54. C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, supra note 28, at 277.
55. G. STIGLER, supra note 38, at 110-11.
56. On intervention with respect to information and coercion, the market "not to im-
pede attainment of ideal equilibrium but rather to increase welfare by tending to correct
imperfections in the market mechanism," see Birmingham, The Consumer as King: The
Economics of Precarious Sovereignty, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 354, 377 (1969).
57. Brandt & Day, Information Disclosure and Consumer Behaviour: An Empirical
Evaluation of Truth in Lending, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 297, 326 (1974); see also Landers &
Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 711, 726, 726
nn.50-51 (1979). For a study finding very little use of contractual planning with respect to
the allocation of responsibility and remedies for defective performance among businessper-
sons, see Beale & Dugdale, Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Con-
tractual Remedies, 2 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'y, 45 (1975).
58. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 507 (consumers are unable to value the earnings
differential at the time of purchase, and they are unlikely to attempt to make such calcula-
tions since the usual buyer expectation is that the goods will work and the credit install-
ments will be paid on time, precluding the incurrence of a legal interest charge).
59. Kornhauser, Unconscionabilit
, 
in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 1151, 1177
(1976).
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interact only withprice; they do not dicker over terms with other
agents."6°
Some consumers may overestimate and overreact to the risk of
uncompensated losses.61 Yet, a low income consumer "who
scarcely knows where the money for his next meal is coming from
is not going to worry much about the risk involved in obtaining
some needed goods when he does not know where next month's
and next year's installments are coming from."' 62 While awareness
of credit costs among low income consumers in the United States
has increased since the enactment of the Truth in Lending Act,63 it
has tended to focus on the dollar finance charge, 64 and, as such,
has been limited to elements of the stated price. The failure to
perceive costs which are not expressed in the stated price produces
an underestimation of uncompensated loss. This underestimation
results in an output increase and a misallocation of resources. In
such circumstances, voluntary exchange does not lead to effi-
ciency.65
One argument which rejects the correlation between a preser-
vation of defenses rule and optimality postulates that if the holder
in due course doctrine66 were inefficient, competition would elimi-
nate it without legal intervention. Therefore, "[t]he survival of the
doctrine in a highly competitive market. . . suggests that it is an
efficient doctrine. ' 67 This view, however, ignores the underesti-
mation of uncompensated consumer loss and financer self-interest
60. Id at 1154 (emphasis added). See also Note, supra note 23, at 1412, 1412 n.14.
61. From this perspective, by shifting the risk of seller's breach to the financial com-
munity, a preservation of defenses rule increases the competitiveness of products manufac-
tured by small firms. "No longer does the customer have to be so concerned about whether
the lower prices at Big Al's discount store merely reflect the lower value of the goods be-
cause Big Al might not be there when you need him." Panel presentation by John P.
Brown, Holder in Due Course: Does the Consumer Pay?, ABA Annual Meeting (August 9,
1976), reprintedin 32 Bus. L. 591, 614, 620 (1977).
62. Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 6
(1969).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691 (1970).
64. See generally Durkin, Consumer Awareness of Credit Terms: Review and New Evi-
dence, 48 J. Bus. 253 (1975).
65. But f. notes 31 and 51 supra and accompanying text.
66. Recently, the "techniques . . . by which [financers] seek to insulate themselves
from claims and defenses arising out of the underlying consumer transaction" have been
treated as being within the holder in due course concept. Rohner, supra note 27, at 505. To
avoid ambiguity and confusion, this Article uses the term "holder in due course" in its
historical meaning which is a bona fide transferee for value of a negotiable instrument who
takes it free from personal defenses of prior, remote parties.
67. R. Posner, supra note 14, at 87-88. See also Epstein, supra note 14, at 308-09.
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of using it rather than eliminating it.68 Any device which in-
creases consumer awareness of uncompensated losses or forces
these costs to be included in the stated price would most likely
result in a contraction of credit.6 9 Financer self-interest would
therefore oppose a preservation of defenses rule. In a market
where "the choice for a buyer, whether to pay for [a contractual
term preserving his defenses against a third party financer], is one
not central to consumer concerns which revolve around quality
and elements of price,"7 a financer's self-interest of providing
more credit at a given price71 is served by a transactional scheme
which lacks a preservation of defenses rule.7"
Obviously, a preservation of defenses rule is bound to produce
costs which are not incurred under a scheme lacking this rule.73
First, there are costs of policing and evaluating merchant perform-
ance. Second, there are costs of buyer misconduct when payment
is unjustifiably withheld. As these costs are initially allocated to
the financer, a party who is better equipped to calculate the value
and the probability of occurrence, the net effect of the rule will be
to substitute a more accurate for a less accurate risk valuation.74
When these additional costs are internalized by financers and re-
flected in the price of consumer credit goods, consumers will be
able accurately to perceive the cost of credit because all credit
costs will be included in the stated price.75
68. "The merchant, of course, is more interested in selling his product than in creating
a knowledgeable non-customer." Birmingham, supra note 56, at 364.
69. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 512. Since higher stated price reflects only higher
cost, the financer will not gain from the effect of the preservation of defenses rule.
70. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 513.
71. See note 69 supra.
72. This proposition clearly supports the conclusion that the consumer's overall re-
sponse to the risk of uncompensated loss (in a scheme lacking a preservation of defenses
rule) tends to underestimate it. See notes 61-65 supra and accompanying text. Overall
overestimation would produce the financer's interest in either minimizing the risk or in-
forming consumers of its true value.
73. See Note, supra note 23, at 1414-15.
74. One result is that firms "can no longer finance part of their cost of entry by skimp-
ing on the cost of supporting a warranty .... [They] will have to back up their warranty
in ways that are credible to experts--the financial community-rather than simply be cred-
ible to potentially gullible consumers." Brown, supra note 61, at 620.
75. While some shifting to cash purchases could result from erecting a preservation of
defenses rule, the magnitude of the shift would depend on consumers' ability to avoid the
use of credit. Note, supra note 23, at 1416-17, 1416 n.23. The following are factors which
are likely to counterbalance or preclude such a shift: (a) The socioeconomic pressures
which encourage the use of credit are unlikely to be affected by a preservation of defenses
rule; (b) a portion of the cost of credit is likely to be reflected not in the price of credit but
in the price of the goods themselves (see note 27 supra and accompanying text) and thus
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One cannot, however, assert categorically that improved seller
performance results from a preservation of defenses rule.76
Financers are likely to exclude disreputable merchants and en-
gage in policing activities only when the costs incurred thereby are
lower than the risk of buyer nonpayment. Should these costs be
higher than the risk of nonpayment, financers are likely to charge
the value of that risk rather than engage in policing merchants.
As a result, less harm will be attributable to a seller's breach, but
only because less value is purchased at the higher price.77
Indeed, "price may rise as the result of [the preservation of
defenses rule] . . . for . . . financers will attempt to recover the
cost of the new risk they face."78 Yet, it is wrong to assume that
"[t]he price increase will probably make consumers worse off."79
Credit in the absence of a preservation of defenses rule and credit
under such a rule are two different commodities. "[O]nly if the
cost of credit before the [rule] plus the cost of the insurance policy
that would provide similar protection to the buyer against shoddy
goods or bad service taken together is less than the cost of credit
[under a preservation of defenses rule] can we say that the ruling
is a mistake and that the cost of credit has gone up."8 °
Also, price should not be confused with cost, and "whether the
actual cost of credit to consumers will rise depends on whether
this new risk is greater or lesser in value than the risk buyers now
bear under current law."'" The new risk faced by a financer can
have a different value than a buyer's risk in the absence of a pres-
cannot be avoided by a shift to cash sales; and (c) constraints on the availability of cash
(and therefore a greater need for credit) will appear if higher prices are charged for goods
as a result of stated price embodying those additional costs which are internalized by sellers
and financers. In addition, insofar as credit card transactions are concerned, the proposed
preservation of defenses rule will apply also to "cash sales," ie., to those purchases paid for
without incurring additional finance charges. See notes 94-107 infra and accompanying
text. In sum, the potential for a shift to cash transactions is minimal. Moreover, if some
shifting occurs, it is unlikely to have any considerable effect on the gains to optimality
produced by a preservation of defenses rule.
76. But see the observation of the U.S. National Commission on Consumer Finance
that the effect of the rule would be to provide "protections which the consuming public will
receive in the form of better goods and services." NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER Fi-
NANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (1972) [hereinafter N.C.C.F. Re-
port].
77. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 513-17.
78. Id at 503.
79. R. POSNER, supra note 14, at 87-88.
80. Brown, supra note 61, at 618.
81. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 503 (emphasis in original).
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ervation of defenses rule. 2 The efficiency produced by the rule is
based on the greater ability of the financer to evaluate the risk
faced thereunder; a financer's actual risk is not necessarily less
than that faced by a consumer in the absence of such a rule.8 3
Finally, as the pre-rule price did not reflect all costs, the "price
increase" produced thereunder may well be illusory. In this light,
a decline in the amount of consumer credit and an impact on mar-
ginal consumers and the businesses which serve them is not
alarming. Indeed, it is the inclusion of all costs of credit goods in
their prices which leads to a more accurate evaluation of costs by
consumers. As such, this reflects a proper move toward optimal-
ity.84
II. TRANSACTIONS COVERED BY THE PRESERVATION OF
DEFENSES RULE
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that efficiency is
promoted by preserving consumer defenses against third party
financers. Efficiency results because financers can more accurately
evaluate the risk of consumers withholding payment than con-
sumers can evaluate the risk of being obliged to continue paying a
financer when a seller breaches.8 5 This may suggest a limit to the
preservation of defenses rule; an accurate financer risk evaluation
is the keystone of its efficiency. Accurate risk analysis may, how-
ever, require a lending relationship which permits low transaction
costs. 86 When transaction costs become prohibitive, the financer
may price the risk arbitrarily or ignore it, resulting in a distorted
credit price. Alternatively, the financer might refuse to finance
the sale, thereby offering less credit than demanded.8 8 These re-
sults would lead to misallocation of resources and the creation of
an equilibrium based on defective decisionmaking. This result
would be inconsistent with the goal of optimality. It is therefore
argued that the preservation of defenses rule should be confined to
situations where transaction costs are not so high that they prevent
accurate risk evaluation.
82. Id at 515 n.24.
83. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
84. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
85. See note 75 supra.
86. Professor Schwartz defines transaction costs as the cost of getting seller and
financer together. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 519.
87. Id
88. Id
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Professor Schwartz has noted that it is common for there to be
low transaction costs "where credit sellers and financers are al-
ready in a bargaining relationship, as when the financer takes a
negotiable note or is the beneficiary of a waiver of defense
clause."89 Therefore, a rule which preserves consumer defenses
against third party financers is clearly warranted when such a re-
lationship exists. It is submitted that the interlocking loan pat-
tern--"a course of dealing between lender and seller [where] the
lender could be expected to contract for recourse rights for its own
self-protection" 90 -also represents such a relationship. Accord-
ingly, Canadian and United States federal laws9' apply to inter-
locking loan patterns as well as to retail paper purchase
arrangements. Indeed, empirical studies show that where a statute
preserves consumer defenses only against purchasers of retail pa-
per, "the direct loan loophole is being used."9 2
While not committing himself to a complete acceptance of the
interlocking loan pattern as an appropriate situation for imposing
a preservation of defenses rule,93 Professor Schwartz concedes that
his analysis94 "may be made more concrete by reference to . . .
bank credit cards." 95 Card-issuing banks insert chargeback privi-
leges in their contracts with merchant members and may charge
back merchants having contracts with other bank members
through the mechanism of the interchange system.96 The preser-
vation of defenses rule should therefore apply to a financer who is
a party to the interlocking loan pattern created by a bank credit
card chargeback system.
Credit card legislation in the United States97 is quite uniform98
in imposing geographical99 and dollar t°" limitations on transac-
tions that fall within the preservation of defenses rule. The geo-
89. Id at 503; see also id. at 517-22.
90. Rohner, supra note 27, at 547; see also id. at 549.
9 1. See notes 2, 3, & 6 supra. Note, however, that the coverage of "the direct loan
loophole" by section 189(3)(b) of the Canadian Bills of Exchange Act was quite narrowly
construed in Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Lively, 46 D.L.R.3d 432, 440 (Can.
1974).
92. Note, Utah's UCCC, supra note 35, at 144.
93. But cf Schwartz supra note 13, at 519 n.28 (acknowledging the existence of low
transaction costs in connection with "closely related" lenders).
94. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text.
95. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 519.
96. Id at 520-21; Rohner, supra note 27, at 541, 548.
97. See, e.g., section 170 of the federal Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974, supra note 2.
98. Massachusetts is the exception to this rule. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255, § 12F
(Supp.) (West 1980); see Note, supra note 23, at 1436-37.
99. The geographical limitation is typically either 100 miles from the residence of
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graphical limitation is traditionally explained by noting the
inability of an issuer to police distant merchants with whom it has
no direct course of dealing.' This explanation, however, ignores
the issuer's ability to charge back through the mechanism of the
interchange system.
A new problem is created when a distant merchant is subject
to an issuer chargeback: the merchant may have practical difficul-
ties in obtaining recourse against an out-of-state purchaser. This
situation could be remedied by providing the merchant with an
opportunity to force the cardholder-purchaser to submit to the ju-
risdiction of the merchant-the place of purchase.'0 2  The
merchant, if successful in the action, could recover on the judg-
ment through the interchange system. 10 3
A dollar amount limitation on imposing a preservation of con-
sumer defenses rule against credit card issuers is supported by the
argument that small dollar amount sales which involve credit card
use are typically cash sales. The use of a credit card is merely a
substitute means of payment and not an extension of credit. t ' * A
second argument is that card issuers should not be burdened with
cardholders or state boundaries. See, e.g., section 170 of the Fair Credit Billing Act of
1974, supra note 2.
100. The minimum dollar amount of the individual transaction to which the preserva-
tion of defenses rule applies is typically $50.00. Id
101. See, e.g., Brandel & Leonard, Bank Charge Cards: New Cash or New Credit, 69
MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1064-68 (1971).
102. Another "geographic limitation on a sliding scale" is suggested in Note, Preserving
Consumer Defenses in Credit Card Transactions, 81 YALE L.J. 287, 305 (1971), in the form
of a "requirement that cardholders return unsatisfactory merchandise and communicate
regarding alleged defects."
103. The proposed Model Act, included as an appendix to this Article, recognizes the
necessity of providing distant merchants with a remedy and sets forth a Forum Selection
Clause. Two exceptions to this general provision are suggested: (a) Where the buyer
chooses to pay for the allegedly defective goods an action for breach could be brought in
any forum having local jurisdiction over the matter, and (b) where the buyer alleges and
can easily establish the likelihood that personal injury was caused by the breach, a court
would have the power to ignore the Forum Selection Clause on equitable grounds. Model
Act § 5 (Appendix II, infra).
A statute which forces the buyer to litigate in the merchant's jurisdiction in the United
States complies with constitutional due process requirements. See Agrashell, Inc. v. Ber-
nard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1965), and Electric Regulator Corp. v.
Sterling Extruder Corp., 280 F. Supp. 550, 556 (D. Conn. 1968) (both cases holding that the
passage of risk of loss to the buyer is a sufficient basis for local jurisdiction). In a face to
face consumer transaction, the risk passes to the buyer on the buyer's receipt of the goods.
U.C.C. § 2-509(3) (namely in the merchant's jurisdiction). At the same time, there could
be circumstances where the application of the suggested.exceptions to the Forum Selection
Clause will be unconstitutional for failure to meet the requirements of minimum contacts.
See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
104. See Note, supra note 102, at 292.
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minor complaints 10 5 and, therefore, a dollar amount limitation
functions as a screening device. Neither argument is convincing.
Again, the card issuer, personally or through the interchange sys-
tem, is in the best position to prevent seller misconduct and dis-
tribute the costs of such misconduct, regardless of the dollar
amount. The administrative costs of processing the small com-
plaints could be internalized by the issuer or could be handled by
applying a small fee or service charge in connection with each
complaint. Indeed, "a. . . dollar cut-off point for asserting de-
fenses means that the bulk of all [credit card] purchases are de-
fense-free as far as the issuer is concerned." ' 6 Meaningful law
reform should therefore remove the dollar and geographical limi-
tations on the preservation of defenses rule in connection with
multilateral credit card plans.10 7
It has been demonstrated that when a financer and a seller are
parties to an existing bargaining relationship, directly or indirectly
through an interchange system, all transactions should fall within
the preservation of defenses rule.0 8 If application of the rule is
limited to the existence of such a relationship, independent lend-
ers, those falling outside an interlocking loan pattern, will be ex-
cluded. Such exclusion, however, undermines the goal of loss
spreading, a basic objective of the preservation of defenses rule
and an element necessary for optimality. 109 Rather than spread-
ing the cost of breach among all consumers, a rule which does not
reach the independent lender will work to spread costs only
among those who obtain credit from financers related to sellers.
Practically speaking, the rule could work "to limit its own scope to
the poorer consumer, and in so doing, to spread the cost of breach
only among customers who purchase from sellers who cater to low
105. Note, Waiver of Defense Clauses in Three Party Consumer Credit Transactions, 11
B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV. 991, 1000 (1970).
106. Rohner, supra note 27, at 548. The American Bankers Association calculates that
the average bank credit card transaction was less than $20.00 in the early 1970's. Id n.208.
107. See Rohner, supra note 27, at 547-49; Note, supra note 23, at 1418-21, 1435; Lit-
tlefield, Preservation of Consumer Defenses in Interlocking Loans and Credit Card Transac-
tions-Recent Statutes, Policies and a Proposal, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 471, 492-502. Under
§ 2(g) of the proposed Model Act (Appendix II, infra), an amount charged to an account
under an open credit plan is a species of "restricted use loan." The card issuer is thus
subject under § 3(a) to "all the consumer's defenses" without any geographical or dollar
limitation.
108. See notes 85-107 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
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income consumers.""'  This will occur because low income con-
sumers with marginal credit ratings may not be able to secure
financing from lenders unrelated to the seller."' A financer pro-
viding credit to low income consumers, who has an established
relationship with a seller, because of the preservation of defenses
rule, will internalize the cost of seller breach and distribute this
loss by charging a higher price for credit. It is unlikely that a
financer will choose to sever existing relationships with dealers on
whom he or she depends in credit marketing. "21 A consumer with
a marginal credit rating who cannot obtain financing from an in-
dependent lender will have to pay a price partly reflecting the cost
of seller breach.
Conversely, a consumer who has a good credit rating can shop
around for the cheapest available financing. A financer who
desires to attract more affluent borrowers may therefore deem it
wise to sever existing bargaining relationships with sellers, avoid
internalizing the costs of seller breach which are imposed by the
preservation of defenses rule, and thereby provide credit at a
lower price to those consumers who can meet the lender's credit
risk standards. Thus, loss spreading would be diminished since
only the price charged from the less creditworthy consumers will
reflect the costs of seller breach. No part of the costs of seller
breach will be reflected in the price charged from the more afflu-
ent consumers.
In addition, the exclusion of independent lenders from the
scope of the preservation of defenses rule is based on unfounded
premises. First, this exclusion embodies the unproven assumption
that the inaccurate lender risk evaluation which results from pro-
hibitive transaction costs' '3 disrupts efficient resource allocation
more than the inaccurate risk evaluation of consumers" 4 who
borrow from independent lenders not subject to a preservation of
defenses rule. ' " Second, because of the efficient methods of infor-
110. Note, The FTC's Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses: Consumer Se-
curit or Consumer Fraud?, I1 VAL. U.L. REv. 263, 288-89 (1977).
11 . Id at 289. The dependence of low income consumers on seller-related sources of
credit was already noted in D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 96 (1963). For a discus-
sion of how only affluent consumers have moved to independent lenders who charge lower
rates and "administer credit far more selectively than the finance company trying to serve
the dealer," see Kripke, supra note 33, at 461-62.
112. For a discussion of this dependence, see Kripke, supra note 62, at 6.
113. For the risk to be evaluated by the financer under the preservation of defenses
rule, see notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
114. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text (efficiency explained).
115. This assumption is correctly rejected by Professor Schwartz. He would require the
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mation dissemination among business entities through organiza-
tions like the Better Business Bureau, it is of questionable validity
to assume the existence of prohibitive transaction costs in connec-
tion with evaluating the risk of a merchant's breach. t t6
Prohibitive transaction costs may nonetheless be involved in
connection with financing a purchase with the proceeds of a small
loan or a small fraction of a loan because the lender will not deem
it necessary to know how these proceeds will be used." 7 It has
also been suggested that "when a lender has no prior bargaining
relationship with the seller and has no business need to know the
use to which the money will be put, the gains in optimality...
are unlikely to outweigh the losses in privacy which are entailed
by requiring the bank to ask the consumer's purpose.- " 8 It ap-
pears, however, that apart from these situations, "the lender's su-
perior ability to minimize the effect of seller misconduct on
innocent parties""' 9 should lead to preserving consumer defenses
in all "loans involving institutional lenders and where the lenders
can be made aware of the particular consumer transaction for
which the proceeds will be used."' 2 ° If a pre-existing recourse ar-
rangement with the seller has not been established, a lender can
either insist on an ad hoc security or recourse device, or adjust the
finance charge to reflect the risk of breach by the particular
merchant. 121
Extending the preservation of defenses rule to the independent
lender who "can be made aware of the particular consumer trans-
action appears to exclude the independent lender who ap-
proves a loan where the use of loan proceeds is limited to a
particular purpose-a restricted use loan-and permits the bor-
legislature to ascertain at what point "the costs of getting seller and financer together [are]
so high that it [is] impossible to predict fewer misallocations from law reform than now
exist." Schwartz, supra note 13, at 519.
116. This appears especially true when the independent lender takes a purchase money
security interest in the consumer goods bought with the proceeds of the loan and acts "not
merely upon the credit of [the consumer-borrower], but upon the credit also of the mer-
chandise which is to be tendered as security." Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park
Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 401, 146 N.E. 636, 641 (1925) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (dealing with
the issuer of a letter of credit).
117. See Note, supra note 23, at 1437 n.128.
118. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 519 n.28.
119. Note, supra note 23, at 1437.
120. Id (emphasis added). The Note does not mention the privacy exception.
121. The proposed Model Act recognizes that the lender should be given a statutory
right of subrogation to the consumer's claim against the teller. See Model Act § 4 (Appen-
dix II, infra). See also Rohner, supra note 27, at 547 n.201.
122. Note, supra note 23, at 1437 (emphasis added).
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rower to shop around for the best buy. Yet, under a preservation
of defenses rule, this lender will calculate aggregate risk-the risk
of breach by any given merchant dealing in a particular industry
or a particular product. A lender is capable of evaluating this risk
without prohibitive transaction costs. Therefore, this evaluation
will be more accurate than a consumer's evaluation of the risk of
losing the right to withhold payment, absent a preservation of de-
fenses rule. 23 Moreover, as contemporary warranties originate
primarily from the manufacturer and not the retailer, the
financer's risk evaluation is likely to be more concerned with the
product than the merchant.24 Preserving consumer defenses thus
promotes efficiency whenever the lender has knowledge of how
the proceeds are used but not necessarily of the particular transac-
tion to which the proceeds are applied. Nonetheless, defining the
scope of a preservation of defenses rule by a lender's knowledge 25
is bound to spawn additional litigation. The potential for litiga-
tion on the issue of lender knowledge could prompt a lender to
question a consumer-borrower about the purpose of the loan, even
in the absence of any other business need for such information.
To avoid wasteful litigation and potential conflicts with a con-
sumer's desire for privacy, the rule should be limited to restricted
use loans-consumer loans given for a particular use, such as the
purchase of a car or, generally, pursuant to an agreement which
restricts the use of loan proceeds to a stated purpose.
Faced with a preservation of defenses rule applicable to such
loans, lenders will adjust their rates to reflect the risk of breach in
different industries, products, or locations. Because the
probability of seller breach is determined by an analysis of a par-
ticular industry and not a particular transaction, transaction costs
should not be prohibitive. Therefore, there is no justification for
excluding low dollar amount restricted use loans from the scope of
a preservation of defenses rule. Of course, a lender could also tai-
lor its risk evaluation to reflect its experience with a particular re-
tailer, when it is known which retailer will be a party to the
123. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
124. The risk of nonperformance by an individual retailer nevertheless cannot be com-
pletely ignored. Merchant-based risk exists with regard to sales practices, product ser-
vicing, administration of manufacturer warranties, product installation, and seller
insolvency. Yet, the value that a financer attaches to the risk of nonperformance by an
individual retailer is normally less than the value which is given to the risk of product
failure. The financer's risk evaluation is thus based primarily on the product.
125. See U.C.C. § 1-201(25)-(27) (1978 version); Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 234 A.2d
860 (1967).
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underlying transaction, or even exclude certain retailers from re-
ceiving the proceeds of a restricted use loan by the terms of the
loan agreement with the consumer. This action would be consis-
tent with another objective of the rule-loss prevention. 26
Thus, the goal of optimal resource allocation is furthered by a
rule which preserves consumer defenses in two situations: against
a financer who maintains a bargaining relationship with the seller
and against an institutional lender extending a restricted use loan
to a consumer.
27
III. SCOPE OF FINANCER EXPOSURE TO CONSUMER DEFENSES
Once the transactional scope of a preservation of defenses rule
has been established, it is necessary to determine the scope of
financer exposure which is consistent with optimal resource allo-
cation. The discussion will focus on the monetary limit of
flnancer exposure. Attention will also be given to the type of con-
sumer defenses available against the financer and restrictions on
the consumer's power to raise them.
Commentators disagree about how much financer exposure
should exist under a preservation of consumer defenses rule. It
has been argued that a rule which limits financer exposure to the
amount which the consumer owes the financer at the time of rais-
ing the defense "penalizes the conscientious consumer who con-
tinues making installment payments in reliance on the empty
assurances of a dishonest dealer that the defect will be re-
paired."' 28 Therefore, it is suggested that financer exposure
should extend to either the amount which that lender has financed
or the face value of the note and contract. 2 9 At a minimum, this
liability should exist for the duration of the term of the contract,
and could even exist without time limitation. 3 ° The Federal
Trade Commission advocates an extended liability without time
limitation.' 3 ' This position has also beeil approved by Canadian
126. The effectiveness of such responses should be bolstered by conferring upon
financers immunity from tort actions by merchants. See Model Act, § 7 (Appendix II,
infra); notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
127. Accordingly, the proposed Model Act applies to an assignee of "consumer sale" as
well as to a creditor in a "restricted use loan" (including a credit card issuer). Model Act,
§ 3(a) (Appendix II, infra).
128. Comment, supra note 35, at 475 (1973).
129. Id
130. Id at 475 n.62. See also N.C.C.F. Report, supra note 76, at 34-38. Of course,
these actions would be subject to the general time limitations on actions in the jurisdiction.
131. Under an FTC Trade Regulation Rule, the liability of the financer is limited to
the amount of the "consumer credit contract." 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.3 (1980).
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provincial legislatures dealing with an assignee's exposure to con-
sumer defenses. 13
2
A rule which extends financer liability and removes any time
limitations on a consumer's right to assert the defense has been
criticized as inconsistent with "the identified goals of risk alloca-
tion, consumer protection, and marketplace policing."'13 3 It is con-
tended that
[amny exposure for the financer beyond the amount owing at the
time the consumer asserts his defense would ... make the con-
sumer's tactical position against the financer better than that
available against the defaulting merchant. . . . If the pro-
claimed evil of holder in due course is that it denies the con-
sumer the tactical opportunity to withhold payments, the
proper response is to restore that balance and no more.' 34
Although extended financer liability furthers loss prevention
and distribution policies because it forces merchants to bear the
full cost of their warranties, 35 such a scheme is inconsistent with
optimality considerations. Increasing the scope of financer liabil-
ity undermines the accuracy with which the risk of liability can be
evaluated. At the same time, apart from the risk of a seller's fraud
or insolvency, a scheme which permits consumers to withhold
payment, but not to recover from a financer, does not appear to
increase significantly a consumer's inaccurately perceived risk; it
is mere speculation to assume that in a case of a disputed con-
sumer claim the financer will be a more lenient defendant than the
seller. Also, as most warranty claims are likely to arise during the
term of the contract, 136 the financer will be involved in most dis-
putes concerning seller breach even under a scheme which allows
withholding payment only. Therefore, it is submitted that an ap-
propriate preservation of consumer defenses rule should not ex-
tend financer liability to the full value of the contract. A
consumer's action should be limited to withholding the amount
132. See, eg., Ontario Consumer Protection Act § 42a (under which recovery against
an assignee is limited to "the balance owing on the contract at the time of the assignment").
The Consumer Protection Act, ONT. Rnv. STAT. c.82, as amended by ONT. STAT. c.24, § 1
(1971).
133. Rohner, supra note 27, at 553.
134. Id at 555. The improvement in the consumer's tactical position is actually the
addition of another potential defendant, the financer.
135. See Part I supra.
136. With respect to hard goods or consumer durables, the credit period is typically
longer than the warranty period. For example, in 1971 the warranties offered by manufac-
turers of cars were 12 months or 12,000 miles, ONTARIO LAW RmORM COMM'N, REPORT
ON CONSUMER WARRANTIES AND GUARANTEES IN THE SALE OF GOODS 83 (1972), but a
$3,000 credit contract on a new automobile in the United States was for a term of 36
months. N.C.C.F. Report, supra note 76, at 15.
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owed to the financer at the time of asserting the defense.137
Optimality principles suggest that the scope of a consumer's
right to withhold financer payment should be coextensive with a
consumer's right to withhold payment from a seller if a third party
financer were not present. A consumer's right to withhold pay-
ment from a financer should not be subject to limits on the type of
defenses available to the consumer, 38 on the time to assert
them, 139 or to other conditions to which the right is tied under
some statutes. 41 Otherwise, the preservation of defenses rule will
not eliminate the entire, undervalued risk of incurring uncompen-
sated loss, and this failure will decrease the effectiveness of the
rule as a device for achieving optimality. 14 1
Nonetheless, the risk of seller fraud or insolvency is not fully
eliminated by a rule which allows a consumer only to withhold
payment. Although the value of these risks is an element of the
cost of the credit or the goods, it is underestimated by consumers.
Therefore, when the prices of credit and consumer goods under
such a rule do not reflect the full cost, the efficient allocation of
resources is disrupted. 142 It is submitted, however, that insofar as
the individual consumer can be aided by public law agencies in
pursuing recovery from a dishonest seller, the benefits of extended
financer exposure are outweighed by the decrease in the accuracy
of a financer's risk evaluation. The preservation of defenses rule
should therefore not include an exception for seller fraud.
The risk of insolvency may involve the risk of a more tangible
137. The general rule proposed by the appended Model Act extends a financer's expo-
sure to "the amount owed under the consumer obligation at the time of setting up the
defense against his or her action on the consumer obligation." Thus, the consumer is only
entitled to withhold payment. Model Act § 3(a) (Appendix II, infra).
138. A typical limitation is one which restricts available consumer defenses to "tort
claims" (presumably defenses arising out of claims for consequential loss). See, e.g., sec-
tion 170 of the Fair Credit Billing Act, supra note 2. See also section 191 of the Canadian
Bills of Exchange Act, which provides that "the right of the holder of a consumer bill or
consumer note . . . is subject to any defence or right of set-off, other than counter-claim."
An Act to Amend the Bills of Exchange Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.4 (1970 1st Supp.) (empha-
sis added).
139. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
140. The most typical statutory obligation is the duty to make a good faith attempt to
resolve the dispute with the seller before withholding payment from the financer. The
burden imposed by this duty has, however, been dismissed as "a rough marketplace
equivalent of the idea of exhausting administrative remedies and should not in any way
inhibit the assertion of genuine defenses." Rohner, supra note 27, at 551.
141. The proposed Model Act explicitly states that a financer is subject to "all the con-
sumer's defenses arising from the seller's breach of the consumer sale." Model Act § 3(a)
(Appendix II, infra).
142. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 31:51
PRESERVATION OF CONSUMER DEFENSES
loss. Although any increase in a financer's exposure to liability is
likely to engender some inaccuracy in the financer's risk evalua-
tion, placing the burden of seller insolvency on the financer will
decrease a consumer's unperceived risk. 143 Yet, an unlimited
financer's exposure, even when confined to a seller's insolvency,
could upset the financer's risk evaluation and affect its accuracy
significantly. This danger may diminish, however, by eliminating
as much uncertainty as possible from the financer's risk evalua-
tion. This could be done, for example, by increasing financer's
exposure in cases of seller insolvency only to a limited extent.
Even then, it may be impossible to determine empirically whether
the gain from decreasing a consumer's unperceived risk outweighs
the possible loss from increasing the inaccuracy of a financer's risk
evaluation. Where optimality considerations are neutral, how-
ever, equity would support a scheme in which losses created by
seller insolvency are absorbed by financers.' 4 Accordingly, in
cases of seller insolvency a financer should be subject to all con-
sumer defenses, except consequential loss, up to the value of the
financed contract or the amount financed. 145
The preceding discussion should not alter the power of courts
to increase a financer's exposure, on a case-by-case basis, within
the framework of existing principles of law. A joint venture, 46 or
a parent-subsidiary relationship between financer and seller,147
and a financer's duty to warn consumers where an intimate rela-
tionship with a seller should reveal the probability of that seller's
breach, 148 are illustrations of this proposition. 149
IV. CONCLUSION
The pursuit of optimality supports a preservation of defenses
rule which applies to a financer who is in a bargaining relation-
143. See text following note 135 supra.
144. The risk of seller insolvency is quite low. According to statistics cited by Professor
Schwartz only 0.002%-0.003% of retail trade outlets went bankrupt in the U.S. in 1967,
1968, and 1969. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 517 n.27.
145. See Model Act, § 3(c)-(e) (Appendix II, infra).
146. See Central Mortgage & Housing Corp. v. Graham, 43 D.L.R. 3d 686, 703-10
(N.S. Sup. Ct. 1973).
147. See Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Unico v. Owen,
232 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1967). But f Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C.
1972) (where the dealer was a franchisee of Ford rather than a subsidiary; query whether
this should have been a valid distinction).
148. See, ag., Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, 447 P.2d 609 (Cal.
1969) (defendant Association failed to protect purchasers from contractor's negligence).
149. The power of courts to extend a financer's exposure in specific situations is pro-
vided for in § 6 of the Model Act (Appendix II, infra).
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ship with the seller. This includes a seller's assignee and a direct
lender who is a party to an interlocking loan pattern. The rule
should apply also to every restricted use loan given to a consumer-
borrower by an institutional lender. Apart from specific situations
covered by general principles of law, a financer's exposure should
be confined to a consumer's right to withhold payment. This right
to withhold payment from a financer should be coextensive with
the right to withhold payment from a seller. It should thus en-
compass all types of defenses and should not be subject to time
limitations or other preconditions. In the case of seller insolvency,
where optimality considerations are equivocal, a financer's expo-
sure to consumer defenses should increase. A financer should be
subject to a consumer's defenses, with the exception of conse-
quential loss, up to the value of the financed contract or the
amount financed.
The adoption of legislation preserving consumer defenses
against third party financers is consistent with the pursuit of op-
timality. Yet, existing statutes in the United States and Canada
do not fully satisfy the optimality model suggested above. In par-
ticular, they do not apply to restricted use loans. Moreover, some
statutory schemes do not address direct lenders or impose time
limitations or other conditions and restrictions on the availability
of consumer defenses. Another frequent statutory impediment to
optimality is a scheme which extends financer exposure beyond
the amount owed by the consumer to the financer without linking
this increased exposure to seller insolvency. It is indeed regretta-
ble that legislatures have failed to give adequate consideration to
the principles of optimal resource allocation when determining
the scope of a preservation of consumer defenses rule.
Appendix I
A British Columbia Model
A notably broad protection will be offered to consumers on the
proclamation of section 8(1) of the British Columbia Consumer
Protection Act. 150 The section reads as follows: "A creditor in a
purchase financing transaction has no greater rights than the seller
and is subject to the same defences as may be raised against the
seller." "[P]urchase financing transaction" is defined in section 1
to mean: "the extension of credit to a borrower by a creditor
where the creditor knows or ought to know that the credit pro-
ceeds will be used by the borrower to purchase goods or services
150. The British Columbia Consumer Protection Act, B.C. REv. STAT. c.6 (1977).
[Vol. 31:51
PRESERVATION OF CONSUMER DEFENSES
from a seller." "Creditor" under section 1 "includes a lender."
"Lender" under section 1 is "a person. . . who in the course of
business extends credit."
The overall effect of section 8(1) is that a lender who "knows
or ought to know that the credit proceeds will be used by the bor-
rower to purchase [consumer] goods" is subject "to the same
defences as may be raised against the seller." This covers the
purchase money lender under a "one shot" loan as well as under a
multilateral credit card plan.' 51
The scheme set up by the interaction of section 8(1) and sec-
tion 3, dealing with the rights of a seller's assignee,15 2 approxi-
mates optimality more than any other enacted statute in North
America. This is achieved because the scheme is not limited to
lenders "closely related" to sellers, does not impose restrictions on
a consumer's right to withhold payment, and, at the same time,
probably limits a lender's exposure to the balance which is due at
the time of the assertion of consumer defenses.' 53 The scheme re-
quires a few amendments, however. In particular an assignee's
exposure under section 3(2) should also be limited to the balance
due at the time of the assertion of defenses. Also, the scope of
section 8(1) should expressly extend to all multilateral credit card
transactions. 15
The scheme should, however, be limited to restricted use loans,
rather than apply to every case of credit extension "where the
creditor knows or ought to know that the credit proceeds will be
used by the borrower to purchase [consumer] goods or services."
151. Note, however, that since "credit" in the British Columbia Consumer Protection
Act is defined in § 1 as "credit. . .for which a borrower incurs a cost of borrowing ... "
§ 8(1) does not apply when the credit card is used as a means of cash payment because no
"cost of borrowing" (charges payable "on the unpaid balance from time to time," § 1) is
incurred in connection with a particular purchase.
152. Section 3 provides, in its relevant part:
(1) Subject to subsection (2), anassignee ofa... seller. . . has no greater right
than, and is subject to the same obligations, liabilities and duties as the as-
signor.
(2) No debtor shall receive from, or is entitled to set off against, an assignee of
the. . . seller an amount greater than the balance owing on the contract at
the time of the assignment.
153. It is regrettable that this effect is not expressly directed. This effect emerges from
the language of§ 8(1) that follows § 191 of the Bills of Exchange Act in subjecting a credi-
tor only to "defences." This is different from the language of § 3(1) of the British Colum-
bia Consumer Protection Act which provides that an assignee of a seller "is subject to the
same obligations, liabilities and duties as the assignor" (but is nonetheless not liable to the
consumer for "an amount greater than the balance owing on the contract at the time of the
assignment"). British Columbia Consumer Protection Act, supra note 150, § 3(2).
154. See note 151 supra.
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The application of the section should also be confined expressly to
credit extended by an institutional lender. 155 In addition, there is
a need to extend a financer's exposure in a case of seller insol-
vency. There is also the need for explicitly recognizing a court's
power to deal with a financer's liability within the framework of
existing principles of law. Nonetheless, the course taken by sec-
tion 8(1) of the British Columbia Consumer Protection Act ap-
pears to be a positive step in the pursuit of optimality.
Appendix I-Model Act
A Proposed Model Preservation of Consumer
Defenses Act
1. Purpose
An Act to preserve consumer defenses against third party
financers.
2. De6nitions
In this Act:
(a) "consumer" means the debtor on a consumer obliga-
tion.
(b) "consumer obligation" means an obligation to pay on:
(i) a credit sale obligation, or
(ii) a restricted use loan, insofar as its proceeds were
used in a consumer sale.
(c) "consumer sale" means the sale of goods or a contract
for the sale of goods by a seller to a buyer for use not
in the course of the buyer's business.
(d) "credit sale obligation" means an obligation to pay for
goods sold in a consumer sale whose terms call for all
or part of the purchase price to be paid after the con-
clusion of the contract.
(e) "financer" means:
(i) a creditor in a restricted use loan or the creditor's
assignee, and
(ii) an assignee of the seller's right to enforce a credit
sale obligation who advances money against
credit sale obligations in the ordinary course of
business.
(f) "open end credit plan" means a plan which estab-
155. Presently, while a "lender" is a person who extends credit "in the ordinary course
of business," the definition of "creditor" is broader than that of "lender." See text follow-
ing note 150 supra.
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lishes accounts between one person and numerous ac-
countholders and enables each accountholder to
purchase goods from third party sellers by charging
each purchase to his account. Amounts due from time
to time on the account are to be paid under the terms
of the plan.
(g) "restricted use loan" means:
(i) money lent in the course of one's business, to a
borrower for use not in the course of business,
pursuant to an agreement which restricts the use
of its proceeds to one or more of the following
uses:
(1) the purchase of goods from a specific seller
or class of sellers,
(2) the purchase of a specific product or type of
goods,
(3) the purchase of goods in a designated local-
ity, or
(4) the purchase of goods made wholly or partly
by a specific manufacturer or class of manu-
facturers, or otherwise identified by a com-
mon element like a common origin,
common source of distribution, trademark
or name.
(ii) an amount, pertaining to a consumer sale,
charged to an account under an open end credit
plan.
3. Consumer's Rights
(a) A financer suing on a consumer obligation is subject to
all the consumer's defenses arising from the seller's
breach of the consumer sale.
(b) A financer's exposure under subsection (a) extends to
the amount owed under the consumer obligation, at
the time the defense is asserted against the financer's
action on the obligation.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), when, due to the
seller's insolvency, the consumer is unable to recover
from the seller the full amount of damage caused by
the seller's breach, the consumer may recover the bal-
ance of the damages from the financer, up to the price
of the goods under the consumer sale.
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(d) A seller is insolvent for the purpose of subsection (c)
when:
(i) he has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary
course of business or cannot pay his debts when
they become due, or
(ii) the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any
property conveyed, transferred, concealed, re-
moved, or permitted to be concealed or re-
moved, with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay
creditors, is not sufficient in amount to pay his
debts, or
(iii) he is subject to, or meets the requirements to be
subject to, an assignment for the benefit of credi-
tors, receivership proceedings, bankruptcy pro-
ceedings or other proceedings intended to
liquidate or rehabilitate his estate, or
(iv) a discharge with respect to his liability on the
consumer sale has been given under any of the
proceedings specified in the preceeding clause.
(e) The consumer's rights under subsection (c) are en-
forceable against the financer either in a separate ac-
tion or in the financer's action on the consumer
obligation. A judgment given in the financer's action
on the consumer obligation does not bar a consumer's
separate action to enforce the rights under subsection
(c), provided that the facts forming the basis for these
rights were not actually determined adversely to the
consumer in the action on the consumer obligation.
4. Financer's Recourse
(a) Where a consumer refuses to pay the ftnancer on the
consumer obligation, alleging rights under section 3,
so long as no final judgment denying the existence of
these rights has been obtained, the financer may re-
cover from the seller the amount he cannot or would
not be able to collect from the consumer on the suc-
cessful assertion of the consumer's rights. This remedy
is without affecting possible alternative recourse or
subrogation rights and absent an agreement to the
contrary.
(b) Where a financer chooses to exercise the rights under
subsection (a), on giving proper notice to the con-
sumer, the seller may either sue the consumer on the
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consumer obligation or continue in the financer's ac-
tion, and for purposes of this action the consumer obli-
gation will conclusively be presumed to be a credit
sale obligation with respect to the goods sold. A prior
final judgment on the consumer obligation is a bar to
the seller's action under this subsection.
(c) A judgment obtained by the seller suing on the con-
sumer obligation under subsection (b), or a judgment
obtained by the financer on the consumer obligation
prior to exercising his rights under subsection (a), can
be recovered by the seller either from the consumer or
from the financer. It can also be collected from the
consumer by the financer.
(d) The purpose of this section is to prevent unjust enrich-
ment and to prevent loss to an innocent party.
5. A Forum Selection Clause in an Open End Credit Plan
(a) Irrespective of any specific or general statute or rule of
law or equity which denies or limits the effect or valid-
ity of a forum selection clause, the terms of an open
end credit plan may provide that the purchase of
goods in a consumer sale, to be charged to an account
under the plan, is deemed to be a submission by the
consumer to the exclusive jurisdiction of any compe-
tent court, otherwise exercising local jurisdiction over
the dispute, which is situated within __ miles from the
place of the purchase. Where provided, such a term is
deemed to be incorporated in the consumer sale as a
forum selection clause.
(b) A term in an open end credit plan authorized by sub-
section (a) is unenforceable where:
(i) the consumer chooses to pay on the consumer
obligation without prejudice to his rights arising
from the seller's breach, or
(ii) the consumer alleges and can easily establish the
likelihood of personal injury caused by the
seller's breach, and the court finds that enforcing
the term would be inequitable.
6. Supplementary Princoles of Law Applicable
General principles of law and equity which enable a court to
find a financer liable in specific situations, even to the extent of the
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whole damage caused by the seller's breach, are not affected by
this Act. Where a court determines that the relationship between
a financer and a seller is a joint venture or a parent-subsidiary
relationship, or that the financer was involved in a scheme which
was likely to produce the seller's breach; a ftnancer is deemed to
be liable to the consumer for the full damage caused by the seller's
breach.
7. Financer's Defense Against Seller
The refusal to deal with a seller or class of sellers, whether
absolute or conditional, and the inclusion in an agreement under-
lying a restricted use loan of any term relating to the choice of a
seller by the consumer, is deemed lawful and is not actionable
against a financer in tort or under any statute by any person ad-
versely affected by such refusal or term. This presumption can be
rebutted by a showing that the financer's decision to refuse to deal
or to include the term was not made in good faith and in accord-
ance with reasonable commercial standards for the protection of
consumers or the financer's own rights.
8. No Waiver of Rights or Implicit Repeal
Except as provided in section 4(a), the provisions of this Act
apply notwithstanding any contrary agreement, principle of law or
equity, or statute.
9. Regulations
Regulations implementing this Act shall provide:
(a) the manner in which meaningful disclosure of rights
under this Act shall be made to consumers,
(b) the manner in which a financer's exposure shall be
computed regarding entries to accounts under open
end credit plans, the use of the proceeds of a restricted
use loan for purposes other than the purchase of goods
under the consumer sale, the consolidation of ac-
counts, or the application of lawful charges on the
consumer obligation, and
(c) the manner of computing mileage in section 5(a).
10. Sanction for Failure to Comply with Regulations
[Such a provision is designed to enhance the effectiveness of
the Act. Its content may be influenced by parallel provisions in
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consumer protection legislation in the adopting jurisdiction. No
particular provision is proposed here.]
Comments
§ 1 Introductory note
This Act is designed to implement the analysis presented in
this Article and to set up a scheme preserving consumer defenses
which effectuates optimal resource allocation. The Act establishes
a scheme which preserves consumer defenses against third party
financers (sections 3 and 6), and provides for rules governing the
position of parties after the effective exercise of a consumer's
rights (section 4 and 5). The scheme is premised on the financer's
greater ability to minimize the cost produced by a seller's breach
and to internalize those costs which cannot be eliminated. 15 6 The
Act thus provides a framework which will enable financers to ac-
complish these goals with immunity from possible tort actions by
merchants (section 7).
§ 2 Preservation of consumer defenses (sections 1, 3, and 6)
The Act governs the preservation of consumer defenses against
third party financers (section 1). It provides in section 3(a) that a
financer's action on "a consumer obligation" is subject to all the
consumer's defenses arising from the seller's breach of the "con-
sumer sale." "Consumer obligation" (as defined in section 2(b))
covers the "credit sale obligation" (defined in section 2(d)) as well
as the "restricted use loan" (defined in section 2(g)). A "financer"
is a creditor in a "restricted use loan" or an assignee of a "credit
sale obligation" (section 2(e)). "Consumer sale," defined in sec-
tion 2(c), relates to the sale of goods to a buyer for use not in the
course of the buyer's business.
A financer's exposure to defenses under the Act extends to
"the amount owed under the consumer obligation, at the time the
defense is asserted against the action on the obligation" (section
3(b)). This means that a consumer is entitled to withhold payment
and assert these rights only as a defense to a financer's action. A
financer is not subject to an affirmativ6 recovery. This limited
financer exposure is subject to two exceptions: 1) In a case of a
seller's insolvency, as defined in section 3(d), the consumer may
recover from the financer, in an action governed by section 3(e),
"the balance of the damages from the financer, up to the price of
156. See generally notes 21-84 supra and accompanying text.
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the goods under the consumer sale" (section 3(c)). 157 2) The Act
does not purport to affect powers of courts, derived from "general
principles of law and equity," to find a financer "liable in specific
situations, even to the extent of the whole damage caused by the
seller's breach" (section 6). Such situations are deemed to exist in
the case of a joint venture or a parent-subsidiary relationship be-
tween a financer and seller, as well as where a financer has a duty
to warn consumers arising from involvement with the seller's op-
erations.15 8
§ 3 The scheme as an effective means to achieve optimality
The scheme set up by the Act is effective in accomplishing the
pursuit of optimality for the following reasons:
1) The scheme applies to an assignee of the sales contract (in-
cluding a purchaser of a negotiable instrument given in payment
thereunder) who is in the business of purchasing retail paper and
to an institutional lender who extends a restricted use loan to a
consumer-borrower (including an issuer under a multilateral
credit card plan).159 The scheme is thus not limited to a financer
"closely related" to the seller or otherwise in a bargaining rela-
tionship.
2) Apart from situations covered by general principles of law,
and subject to a limited insolvency exception, a financer's expo-
sure is confined to a consumer's right to withhold payment. 61
3) The consumer's right to withhold payment against the
financer is coextensive with the right to withhold payment against
the seller. It encompasses all defenses and is not subject to time
limitations or other preconditions. 6'
§ 4 Financer's recourse and merchants' rights (sections 4 and 5)
Where a consumer effectively exercises the rights under the
Act and withholds payment against a financer, section 4(a) gov-
erns the financer's recourse against the seller. 6 2 The purpose of
this section is to prevent unjust enrichment (section 4(d)). It ap-
plies only "absent an agreement to the contrary" and "without
affecting possible alternative. . . rights." No other provisions of
157. For a discussion of the insolvency exception, see notes 143-45 supra and accompa-
nying text.
158. See notes 146-48 supra for examples of such involvement.
159. See notes 85-127 supra and accompanying text.
160. See notes 128-49 supra and accompanying text.
161. See notes 138-41 supra and accompanying text.
162. See notes 21-36 supra and accompanying text.
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the Act can be modified by agreement or, even implicitly be re-
pealed by statute (section 8). Where a financer exercises the rights
under section 4(a), "the seller may. . . sue the consumer on the
consumer obligation" (section 4(b)). The controversy regarding
the seller's performance can therefore be resolved by the parties to
the contract for sale. In a case of a multilateral credit card plan,
the Act meets the legitimate grievance of a merchant, forced to sue
a distant buyer who has withheld payment, by providing in sec-
tion 5 for a forum selection clause. Such a clause is essential to
the acceptability of multilateral credit cards from buyers living in
distant jurisdictions and may provide for the submission by the
consumer to the seller's jurisdiction. The clause is effective only
where the consumer chooses to withhold payment. It does not
preclude a consumer from paying on the debt and then pursuing
his or her remedy in any court having local jurisdiction over the
matter. A court could refuse to enforce the forum selection clause
in a case of personal injury. 63
§ 5 Financer defenses
The Act is premised on a financer's superior ability to mini-
mize the costs produced by seller breach and to internalize those
costs which cannot be eliminated. Therefore, so long as the
financer acts "in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards," he or she should be given complete free-
dom in selecting merchants and negotiating agreements. 64 Sec-
tion 7 thus provides a financer with a good faith defense in any
action in tort or under statute which is based on a "refusal to deal
with a seller or class of sellers, whether absolute or conditional."
This defense is also available in an action based on "the inclusion
in an agreement underlying a restricted use loan of any term relat-
ing to the choice of a seller by the consumer." Such a defense
would provide a measure of freedom to financers seeking to estab-
lish or terminate bargaining relationships with sellers. It would
also permit an independent lender to exclude disreputable retail-
ers from receiving the proceeds of restricted use loans and enable
the lender to set different rates for restricted use loans, adjusted
according to the reputation of the merchant to whom the proceeds
would be directed.1 65
163. See notes 95-107 supra and accompanying text.
164. See notes 21-84 supra and accompanying text.
165. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
